

EXHIBIT NO. 60

[1]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ground Forces.

1. *Basic Considerations.**a. National Policy.*

Defense of Western Hemisphere.

Preservation of war effort of Britain, Russia and associated powers.

Curb of Japanese aggression.

Eventual defeat of Germany.

b. Requirements.

Germany cannot be defeated by supply of munitions to friendly powers, and air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be required.

(1) *Western Hemisphere Security.*

Provide minimum garrisons necessary to hold outlying bases in event of sudden collapse of United Kingdom.

Prepare task forces for prompt employment against Atlantic islands and Natal region of Brazil.

(2) *Western Pacific Theater.*

Rush build-up of air power to Philippines, together with small increases in modern ground army equipment and personnel to restrain Japan from advance into Malayasia or Eastern Siberia.

(3) *European Theater.*

Prepare security forces for air and naval bases in the British Isles and Ireland. Prepare task forces to secure, when opportunity offers, additional bases encircling Germany. Britain is reaching limit of usable man power. We must supplement her forces.

Prepare framework for forces eventually to defeat Germany. Time is required to organize, train and equip these.

(In handwriting
on Margin:)

[2] 2. *Immediate Requirements.*

As long as Britain stands and her Fleet remains intact.

a. ATLANTIC BASES.

1,500 total this fall

(1) *Greenland.* Authorized 2,500; Now there only construction troops and local guards. Base for staging aircraft to Britain and patrol base for North Atlantic. Secure defense of bases and cryolite mines essential. Forces must be dispatched earliest moment.

4,500 total this fall

(2) *Newfoundland.* Authorized 5,500; now there 2,500. Naval and air bases for protection of Great Circle Route, and to assist Canadians in defense of Newfoundland. Dispatch of approximately 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these must be equipped and available in United States.

2,000 total this fall

(3) *Bermuda.* Authorized 4,000; now there 800. Air and naval base. Contribute to defense of Atlantic Seaboard. Dispatch of about 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these forces must be available in United States.

350 total this fall

(4) *Jamaica.* Authorized 876; now there 14. Essential staging field. Ground forces of 350 men required for protection United States installations. Dispatch of remainder can be deferred.

Leave

(5) *Puerto Rico.* Authorized and present garrison 21,000. Advanced air and naval base. New naval base under development. Covers approaches to Panama Canal. From military point of view, reduction in garrison by demobilization of Puerto Rican National Guard is feasible. Demobilization would have adverse political reaction and serious economic repercussions.

12,000 total this
fall

(6) *Trinidad*. Authorized 16,000; now there 1,800. Naval anchorage. Major air base for protection Southeast approaches to Caribbean. Jumping off point for prompt movement into South America. Ground forces required for protection and mobile reserve for prompt movement. Dispatch of about 4,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but this remainder must be immediately available in United States.

O. K.

(7) *British Guiana, St. Lucia, Antigua*. Authorized and presents 350 men each. Essential air and naval bases and staging fields.

O. K.

(8) *Panama*. Authorized and present 33,000. Ground forces essential to protect locks and utilities, and for ship guards and small reserve for use in South and Central America. Air defense demands continuous alert, necessitating forces occupying over 300 scattered positions. Ground forces cannot be safely reduced.

O. K.

b. PACIFIC BASES.

(1) *Alaska*. Authorized 24,000; now there 16,000. Air and naval bases covering Great Circle Route to Far East. Isolated. [3] Poor communications. Great distances. Fleet in Pacific reduces threat. Authorized garrison essential to reasonable security.

O. K.

Leave as is.

(2) *Hawaii*. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installations (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded, requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in United States to give Fleet freedom of action.

12,000 additional

(3) *Philippines*. Present garrison or enroute 31,000 (12,000 native troops). Critical situation. Japan wavering. Strong air and naval forces on her flank may deter her or wean her from Axis. If Japan moves, forces in position to assist Associated Powers. No reduction possible, on the contrary reinforcements of about 12,000 troops, including air complements, in prospect. Philippine Army in process of organization 80,000 by January 1, 1942.

c. TASK FORCES.

(1) Organized forces for overseas expeditions. Two forces especially trained for landing attacks. Complete equipment and ammunition reserves necessary.

O. K.

(a) *East Coast Task Force with amphibious training*. One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. Possible use; Azores, Cape Verdes, Martinique.

Out but O. K. as an
Emergency Task
Force

(b) *West Coast Task Force with amphibious training*. One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. For use in Pacific or west coast South or Central America. Available for use in Atlantic.

O. K.

(c) *Relief Forces*. For Azores, Cape Verdes, one division (reinforced) 27,000 men. After taking Azores, Cape Verdes, specially trained amphibious task force should be relieved and quickly reconstituted for additional operations.

O. K.

(d) *Expeditionary Force*. Reinforced Corps (3 divisions foot; two divisions armored; reinforcing units)—154,000. For use as required; Brazil, Africa, Philippines, England, Middle East. Essential to security Western Hemisphere, for exploiting success of task forces and for carrying out commitments of ABC-1.

O. K.

(e) *Iceland Force*. One division (reinforced) 28,000 men. 5,000 now in Iceland. Remainder to relieve Marines and British in spring of 1942.

d. REMAINDER OF ARMY.

(1) *Ground Forces:*

(a) GHQ Reserve (4 armored, 2 cavalry divisions, antiaircraft) ..	115,000
(b) Two field armies (20 infantry divisions)	465,000

[4] *Air Forces.*

(a) Combat.....	60,000
(b) Maintenance.....	40,000
(c) Schools.....	150,000

(3) *Additional personnel.*

(a) Harbor Defenses.....	45,000
(b) Administrative overhead.....	125,000
(c) Trainees not assigned to units and instructors.....	150,000

Total.....	1,150,000
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(4) The Ground and Air Combat Forces are essential :

(a) For reinforcement of expeditionary forces—always unpredictable and to meet the unexpected.

(b) To permit rapid expansion.

(c) For training of new units and reserves.

(5) Armored Forces included are difficult to train. Approximately 9 months required. Large number of specialists. Cannot be readily created by conversion of other forces. Any operations against Axis will require high percentage of armored forces. First two armored divisions about 90% equipped, with 95% proposed by April 1, 1942. Second two divisions recently organized, about 45% equipped. Equipment for third two divisions 20% or less. By spring of 1942, four armored divisions will be 85% or better equipped and trained. The remaining two cannot be ready for operations before the late summer of 1942. No reduction in armored units should be made.

3. *Effect on Defense Aid of reducing Ground Forces.*

a. Policy of Defense Aid should be based on :

(1) Task forces equipped 100%.

(2) Overseas forces equipped 100%.

(3) Remaining Army Forces equipped 50%.

b. Task forces require 100% equipment for combat. Any reduction in strength will reduce Tasks which can be undertaken.

c. A reduction of 25% in the personnel of overseas departments would have no effect on anti-aircraft material and combat vehicles and only minor effect on infantry and artillery matériel. Similar reduction in strength of Base Forces would not materially increase the amounts of Defense Aid releases. Excluding the Philippines, the saving in shipping would amount to some 32,000 tons annually.

d. Reduction of equipment of Remaining Army Forces below 50% is impossible without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of new units. Additional Defense Aid matériel from this source can be obtained only by reduction in number of units.

[5] e. Summarizing, no appreciable increase in Defense Aid items desired by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of Remainder of Army.

4. *Future Requirements.*

By 1943, Nazis may dominate Europe from Urals to Iberian Peninsula and from Scandinavia to North Africa. Germany's war machine may comprise 400 divisions. Collapse of Russia, England, offensive tactics by Japan and belligerent attitude in Latin America are possibilities. We must prepare to meet these eventualities.

Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step is the only practical way of wearing down here war potential by military and economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and annihilate the German military machine. Forces deemed necessary at this time to accomplish role of ground units in supreme effort to defeat Germany comprise five field armies of about 215 divisions (infantry foot, armored, motorized, airborne, mountain and cavalry). If the United States remains committed to the policy of defeating Germany, making an all-out effort mandatory, then we must build toward these forces as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the initiative we must have forces available for employment at the time and place of our own choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our present forces may result in fatal delay. Time is required for the training of forces in the technique of modern war. We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and

we should push on with unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes of policy are seldom justified in prolonged efforts, and are devastating to organized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to shift our national objectives by the reduction of our army at the present time, might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give the Russian and British governments, would be far outweighed by the positive indications it would give to the German government, that they need not fear an eventual onslaught of ground forces.

5. Conclusions.

No appreciable increase in items of equipment especially needed by the British (AA guns, armored vehicles and ships) will result from any reduction of Army ground forces, which can be justified by the present international situation.

Chief of Staff.

Confidential

Proposed United States deliveries of light tanks, M3, October 1, 1941, to completion of contracts

NOTE: No English Contracts Scheduled

Months (1)	Total pro- ductions (2)	Allocations to—	
		Other Nations (3)	United States (4)
October.....	290	183	107
November.....	300	180	120
December.....	310	180	130
January.....	330	100	230
February.....	360	110	250
March.....	400	300	100
April.....	400	300	100
May.....	400	300	100
June.....	400	300	100
Sub total.....	3,190	1,953	1,237
July.....	400	300	100
August.....	400	300	100
September.....	400	300	100
October.....	130	98	32
Totals.....	4,520	2,951	1,569